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Mobile borders and turbulent mobilities:  mapping the geopolitics of the Channel Tunnel 
Chenchen Zhang (chenchen.zhang@qub.ac.uk) 
Abstract: This article investigates the making and contestation of mobile borders around the Channel 
Tunnel, the fixed link connecting Britain and the European continent. It suggests that the bordering of 
the infrastructural and vehicular spaces is both an object of inquiry in its own right and a productive 
lens for reflecting on questions related to EU territory, the heterogeneous nature of borders as well as 
the interplay between regimes of control and resistance. The paper starts by reviewing the legal and 
institutional frameworks in which the Channel Tunnel area is governed and envisioned as an 
interstate and European/Schengen borderzone. It then examines the uncoordinated efforts of national, 
private and European authorities in managing the episodic migration controversies around this area, which 
bring together the interconnected rationales of security, economy and humanitarianism and expose the 
dissonance between and within them. Finally, the article considers how the acts of turbulent mobilities 
interact with this contingent assemblage of mobility governance and realise the radical potential of 
territorial borders. 
 
‘Breakfast in Brussels, lunch in London, dinner in Paris.’  
-- Metropolitan, Eurostar’s onboard magazine  
‘Terrorists' fast train to Britain: Mail exposes shocking security flaws that allow ANYONE to get to 
the UK on Eurostar without a passport’ 
-- Headline of a Daily Mail story1 
 
Introduction 
Throughout its conception, construction and operation, the Channel Tunnel fixed link 
connecting Britain and the European continent has been at the centre of longstanding controversies 
over regional development, geopolitical identity, and more recently border security2. Especially 
from 1999 onwards, the tunnel itself, the passenger and freight trains through it as well as the transit 
migrant camps in Sangatte and Calais have all become an integral part of the public imagination of 
border ‘problems’ on both sides of the English Channel3. At the height of the European refugee 
‘crisis’ in 2015, the reported number of attempts to enter the Channel Tunnel facilities in Calais 
seemed so alarming that ‘majorities’ of French and British respondents would support ‘sending the 
British Army in to Calais’ according to an opinion poll4. In fact, the hybrid and continuous space 
encompassing the railway stations, the infrastructural network as well as the vehicles constitutes 
borders not only in imaginative and representational ways, but also in concrete institutional and 
geophysical terms. It is in this space where mobile and ‘mobility-dependent’5  bordering practices, 
regulated by an array of institutional arrangements and conditioned by its geophysical 
characteristics, take place. However, although the Anglo-European rail link has been examined by 
political and economic geographers, previous studies have focused mainly on issues such as 
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national legal identity and cross-border regional development, rather than the processes that 
construct the rail link and the space it generates as mobile borders. On the other hand, scholars of 
border and migration studies have looked at the politics of sovereign exclusion, humanitarian 
government and migrant activisms in Sangatte and Calais6, without paying much attention to how 
specific institutional and material conditions shape the simultaneously de- and re-territorialising 
effects of the Anglo-European and Schengen border. 
The making (and unmaking) of this borderzone deserves a closer scrutiny not only because 
it is undoubtedly one of the ‘hotter’ ones in Europe - few others convey such contradictory images 
ranging from frequent travellers’ lounges, cosmopolitan-spirited on-board magazines to electrified 
fences, ‘jungle’-like makeshift camps and desperate journeys as it does, but also because it offers a 
unique prism through which to reflect on broader discussions on EU territoriality, the polysemic 
nature of borders as well as the relationship between bordering practices and the turbulent 
mobilities that exceed it. The field of critical border studies has over the last decades advanced a 
‘processual shift’7  that views borders no longer as taken-for-granted and stable objects but as 
‘manifold and in a constant state of becoming’8. Challenging conventional understandings about 
who does borderwork and where borders are, this scholarship has proposed to study borders in 
terms of bordering practices carried out by different state and non-state actors at and far away from 
the territorial edge. The disaggregated and ‘fluid’ dimensions of borders have been further 
elaborated on through the concept of borderscapes, which emphasises that borders are at once 
established and ‘continuously traversed by a number of bodies, discourses, practices and 
relationships’ involving endless negotiations of identities and boundaries9. In other words, the 
multiplicity of borders not only refers to the fact that borders are produced at multiple sites, 
‘dispersed a little everywhere’10 in various political, legal, and socioeconomic processes, but also 
recognises that these processes are themselves highly contested, fragmented and constitutive of 
alternative border imaginaries. One of the key problematics in the transformation of borders is the 
nexus of security and mobility: diffused, networked and outsourced modalities of bordering 
practices are organised around the central task of facilitating transnational flows of circulation while 
at the same time identifying, preventing or slowing down unwanted mobilities that are perceived as 
a security problem11. Investigating the security/mobility nexus requires not only analysing the 
governmental regimes and technologies policing and regulating the movement of people and things, 
but also accounting for the ambivalent relationship between regimes of control and strategies of 
resistance without assuming one ‘comes before’ the other12.   
This paper builds on and contributes to these overlapped strands of literature in border and 
mobility studies by examining the tensions and disjunctions in the multi-sited production of the 
Channel Tunnel as a European and Schengen borderland that is both fixed, ‘traditional’ – located at 
territory’s edge, and mobile, centred on enabling smooth and secured mobility. I contend that it 
makes a particularly productive case study in several ways. First, the geopolitical positioning of the 
tunnel at the internal borders of the European Union (EU), external frontiers of the Schengen area13, 
and as a fundamental infrastructural project of a European border region implies that the mobility-
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dependent bordering practices are situated in and expressive of different legal and normative 
constellations. Exploring the tensions and conflations between these frameworks enables us to 
better comprehend the manifold nature of borders as well as the ‘overlapping, competing and 
uncoordinated’14 principles involved in governing the nexus of security and mobility. Secondly, as 
geographers have accentuated the inseparability of mobility and its immobile ‘moorings’ 15 , 
researchers of borders and security have also started to pay more attention to the physical 
infrastructures and other materials – such as vehicles, roads, maps and ‘deserted’ objects16 - of 
human mobility. Walters for example argues that ‘the material properties of the mode of 
transportation’ is crucial to understanding how vehicles and their systems define ‘limits and 
possibilities for migration politics’. 17  Along these lines, the case in question offers a unique 
opportunity to illuminate how the specificities of (immobile) rail infrastructures and (moving) trains 
not only become integral to visual and discursive representations of borders, but also, together with 
the multiplicity of legal regimes and political rationales, impact upon the limits of border policing 
and possibilities for resistance. Thirdly and relatedly, a geopolitical reading of the Channel Tunnel 
as effectively the actual territorial border also allows us to reflect on the radical potential of 
territoriality and its relation to mobility politics.      
Approaching borders as both juridico-political and geophysical constructs, this article aims 
to investigate the uncoordinated ways in which various institutional, representational and 
geophysical forces participate in the crafting of mobile borders along the Channel Tunnel and 
interact with the struggles of turbulent mobilities. Inspired by Cresswell and Martin’s discussion of 
turbulence, I refer to illegalised and often violent journeys across the English Channel as turbulent 
mobilities: they are turbulent as they follow unpredictable and spontaneous iterations, interrupting 
the orderly systems of mobility both literally – by causing for example temporary suspension of 
train service and lorries stuck in motor ways – and figuratively, by putting the exclusionary logic of 
the entire border regime into question. If the notion of turbulence highlights the ‘entanglements of 
disorder and order’ and ‘makes visible the always-contingent orderings of infrastructural 
mobilities’ 18 , then the rationales, discourses and organising logics of bordering are also 
characterised by heterogeneity and contingency. As Cooper and Perkins have argued, bordering as a 
‘practical activity’ involves overlapping processes in which state and private actors ‘draw upon 
different sources of legitimacy – or rule structures – in order to frame, produce and resist borders’, 
and the processes form a ‘fragile assemblage of actors, rules and objects’19. Both this fragility of the 
assemblage of competing rules and logics and the material properties of mobility – in this case the 
geophysical site containing and constituted by railroads, stations and vehicles – are instrumental to 
the politics of resistance that takes the form of turbulent mobilities. 
While aware of the importance of everyday and routinised practices that take place at the 
border20, this article has chosen to focus on discursive, institutional and material bordering projects 
at macro- and meso- levels. In so doing it seeks to foreground that borders at the Channel Tunnel 
are ‘performed into being’21 not only by the everyday policing of the infrastructural and vehicular 
spaces there, but also through institutional and representational practices done elsewhere: in 
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national and EU laws, parliamentary debates, popular press, transnational solidarity activisms and 
so forth. Therefore, although the article has benefited from observations and conversations made in 
nodal points such as Calais and London St Pancras Station, the analysis draws mainly from a range 
of archival materials including international treaties, legal proceedings, public speeches and media 
narratives. Critical security scholars have argued that speech-acts do not ‘simply describe an 
existing security situation’ or represent a border crisis, but ‘bring it into being’ by ‘successfully 
representing it as such’22. Similarly, these textual and visual discourses bring the moving borders 
into being through a plurality of spatial imaginaries that are not limited to that of sovereign security. 
They also reflect the actual or perceived conflicts between the interests and calculations of different 
actors.    
The first part of the article reviews the legal and institutional frameworks in which the 
Channel Tunnel area is governed and envisioned as an interstate and European/Schengen 
borderzone. The first section examines the international treaties that lay down the legal grounds for 
frontier controls on the new Anglo-French border, and section 2 illuminates how the border-making 
projects merge two contrastive visions of EU territory, and challenge the dichotomous framing of 
the European space as either fortress-like or cosmopolitan, or a combination of the two designated 
to the edges and centres separately. The article then analyses the responses of national, private and 
European authorities to the episodic migration controversies around the Channel Tunnel at length. 
Both utilising and circumscribed by the material properties of the infrastructures, vehicles and 
routes, these uncoordinated efforts constitute a fragile assemblage of mobility governance that 
constantly discloses the dissonance between and within the interconnected rationales of security, 
economy and humanitarianism. Finally, the article considers how attending to these institutional and 
material specificities helps us better understand the ambivalent relationship between the regimes of 
border/mobility control and the politics of border/mobility struggles.  
Setting the scene I: the legal framework for the Channel Tunnel  
The first joint statement approving construction of a fixed link between Britain and 
mainland Europe was announced by British and French leaders in 1966, but the project was then 
unilaterally abandoned by the British government in the 1970s amidst the economic crisis. It was 
not until 1981 that the Channel Tunnel project was officially revived by then British Prime Minister 
Thatcher and French President Mitterand; and as Sparke has observed23, the trend of regionalisation 
in the context of European integration provided a major impetus for the renewed interest in this 
century-old idea. The treaty authorising the construction of the tunnel and establishing its 
governance structure, known as the Treaty of Canterbury, was finally concluded between the UK 
and France in 1986. A supplementary Concession Agreement awarded a 55-year concession 
(extended to 99 years in 1997) to Eurotunnel, a private company, for building and operating the 
tunnel. Although the Treaty itself did not include provisions on concreate measures concerning 
border and immigrant controls, Art. 4 described the general principle as ‘the frontier controls shall 
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be organised in a way which will reconcile, as far as possible, the rapid flow of traffic with the 
efficiency of the controls’24.   
Provisions for frontier controls and policing became the subject of the Sangatte Protocol, 
signed by the British and French governments in 199125 . The Protocol reiterated the general 
purpose of ‘simplifying and speeding up’ (Art. 5) the formalities related to entry and exit, and 
established accordingly the so-called ‘juxtaposed controls’: a set of arrangements to enable French 
border authority to set up checkpoints at Cheriton in Kent and British authority to operate at 
Coquelles in France. These arrangements would be later on extended to include Belgium through a 
tripartite agreement. Critical to the implementation of juxtaposed controls is the notion of ‘control 
zone’ (zone de contrôles), defined in the Protocol as ‘the part of the territory of the host State’ 
within which ‘the officers of the adjoining State are empowered to effect controls’. More 
specifically, control zones include terminal stations of the cross-channel rail link and the trains, 
where officials of the other contracting party are authorised to carry out checks (Art. 1). However, 
although the original Protocol mentioned that states may ‘agree to an extension of the control zones 
for through trains, as far as London and Paris’ (Art. 7), as such this agreement did not extend 
control zones to other stations beyond each end of the tunnel itself. After the passenger train service 
started to operate in 1994, the absence of pre-embarkation passport control on persons was believed 
to have contributed to what was referred to as a ‘loophole’. British politicians claimed that ‘for 
several years, people trying to enter our country without adequate documentation’ had ‘been 
misusing the Eurostar service’26. In an attempt to close this ‘loophole’, the two parties signed an 
Additional Protocol in 2000, which established pre-embarkation immigration control bureaux at all 
the terminal stations served by Eurostar in both countries27. This instrument explicitly states that 
authorities of the state of arrival shall have extraterritorial power in these control zones to check 
‘whether the person is in possession of the necessary travel documents and fulfils the other 
conditions for entry to its territory’ (Art. 3). Crucially, the Additional Protocol provides that the 
responsibility to process asylum claims lies with the state of departure if such claims are made 
during a control, after ‘the person has passed through this control and before the train doors close’. 
The responsibility nevertheless shifts to the state of arrival after the train doors have closed (Art. 4).  
These international agreements hence lay down the legal framework for the hybrid space of 
governance engendered by the Channel Tunnel, built to ‘bridge’ the natural maritime border, to 
function, somewhat paradoxically, as moving borders. Central to this framework is the introduction 
of juxtaposed controls as a form of extraterritorial immigration control28. As Shah has pointed out, 
the practice of extraterritoriality has always been a constitutive element of territorial sovereignty. 
Extraterritorial practices reinforce, rather than undermine, the juridico-political dimension of 
territory through mutually recognising and legitimating the extension of sovereign power beyond 
the ‘traditional’ territory. In other words, the physical dimension of territory is ‘legally modified’ to 
‘carve out spheres of sovereign authority’29. The definition of ‘control zones’ provided in the 
Sangatte Protocol is illustrative of this legitimation work which extends the state’s juridical power 
outside its physical territory while at the same time reaffirms territorial jurisdiction as the basis of 
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authority. In the context of immigration controls, extraterritorial bordering practices through the 
employment of offshore detention centres, ‘preventative’ interventions and pre-clearance 
arrangements enable the state to police its borders and detect unwanted mobilities far away from its 
frontiers. In comparison with these other ‘technologies of extraterritorialisation’30, however, the 
arrangements of policing and surveillance in the space of the Channel Tunnel are exceptionally 
territorial – they take place at the extended frontier where one has access to a fixed and indeed high-
speed link to the territory of the state of arrival. In this sense control zones at the stations and on 
moving trains are effectively the physical borders between sovereign states. The antinomy between 
speed and security, closure and connectivity, fixity and motion is played out in this particular 
combination of legal and geophysical settings that bring about a border space that in a way 
embodies ‘traditional entry points’, but of which the primary purpose is to connect and transport, 
instead of fixing or delimiting. The arrangements of juxtaposed control and the conflation between 
the physical frontier and the transportation network reinforce the exclusiveness of territory as 
jurisdiction on one hand, and amplify the connective capability of territory as geographical space on 
the other. 
Another significant point about the legal framework is the ambiguous status of Eurotunnel 
and the relationship between the concessionaries and the governments in managing security and 
frontier controls. On the one hand, although policing and immigration controls are carried out by 
state authorities, Eurotunnel is responsible for constructing the ‘buildings and installations 
necessary for frontier controls’. The private company shall also ‘ensure the continued flow of the 
traffic in the Fixed Link under satisfactory safety conditions’, and ‘that all necessary steps are taken 
to permit the steady flow and continuity of traffic’ through the tunnel31. On the other hand, Article 
2(2) of the Treaty provides that the governments must ‘adopt such legislative and regulatory 
measures, and take such steps, as are necessary for the construction and operation of the Fixed Link’ 
by the concessionaires. In short, Eurotunnel and the governments ought to take joint responsibilities 
for the ‘normal’ operation of the transport network and for ensuring the exercise of police and 
frontier controls. As to be shown in Section 3, however, these provisions also give all actors leeway 
to ignore their responsibilities and play a blame game when turbulent mobilities disrupt the ‘stead 
flow’ of traffic. A final noteworthy feature of this set of international agreements is that although 
made between national governments and private concessionaires, as Darian-Smith has pointed out, 
the jurisdiction of EU law necessarily ‘lurks in the background’32. For example, the construction 
and operation of the tunnel shall comply with relevant Community rules, such as freedom of 
movement, and the ‘facilitations of controls and administrative formalities’ shall be pursued in 
accordance with relevant directives33. On this note, we now move on to explore in more detail the 
‘EUropean’ dimensions of the Channel Tunnel that are not limited to the influence of EU legislation 
in the background. The border-making project is also profoundly associated with two ostensibly 
competing projects of EU territory epitomised by the Schengen space and cross-border regionalism.    
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Setting the scene II: when Schengenland meets Euroregion 
The scholarship on the restructuring of borders and territoriality in Europe have typically 
presented two contrastive imageries with regard to its ‘internal’ and ‘external’ respectively - a 
‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘network’ Europe centred on connectivity and mobility in which the 
significance of state borders is diminishing34, and a ‘Fortress Europe’ where borders are reinforced 
in physical, technological as well as cultural-identitarian terms.35  The ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
borders have also been explicitly framed as fundamentally different and negatively correlated in the 
official discourse – to the degree that the ‘strengthening of the Union’s external borders’ would be a 
‘corollary to the abolition of internal borders’36. In their analysis of the Draft Constitution of the 
European Union, Bialasiewicz et al. find that not only borders are considered qualitatively different; 
one could also identify two distinct narratives of EU territory in this indicative document. They 
observe an ‘aspirational’ notion of territory conveyed by the idea of territorial cohesion, which 
envisions Europe as ‘a putative space of values and area of solidarity’37. Yet also endorsed therein 
is an idea of ‘hard’ territory in the traditional sense of the term, primarily organised around issues of 
external border control and jurisdictional delimitation. However, although pointing out the 
distinction between these two types of ‘territory’ can be analytically useful, we should caution 
against the dichotomous thinking that serves to naturalize the binaries of internal/external borders 
and internal/external mobility. Contributions from critical border studies have sought to question 
this binary, showing that the internal/external differentiation has been socially and politically 
constructed both in the EU case and in the historical development of national borders38. But what 
seems to remain underexplored is how different geopolitical visions of the European space interact 
and overlap with one another beyond this constantly reproduced differentiation. Indeed, 
geographers working on the spatial development agenda of the EU and political scientists studying 
its multilevel border management regime rarely engage with one another, even though both fields 
deal with the changing nature of borders and territory in the area. Located in the only European 
cross-border region which stretches across Schengen borders, the case of the Channel Tunnel is 
distinctly suitable for the task of not only challenging the binary of cosmopolitan versus fortress 
Europe, but also engaging a dialogue between these different disciplinary foci.    
As the epigraph of this article shows, one could easily consider the transnational transport 
network and its iconic high-speed passenger train as symbolising a borderless Europe defined by 
connectivity and hybermobility. A distinct European character has been evident ever since the early 
stage of the project. While the English side was at the beginning deeply concerned with her 
endangered national identity in front of all the dangerous things – ranging from rabies to military 
invasion – that would be brought by the tunnel from mainland Europe39, then French president 
Mitterrand would praise the Tunnel as representing an ever closer community with a single 
‘nervous system’40. Despite the initial resistance and anxiety, the construction of the tunnel was 
eventually perceived by local leaders as an impetus for further cross-border collaboration, or a 
‘catalyst for regional economic development’ 41 , leading to the establishment of a so-called 
Euroregion in 1991 comprising Kent, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, and the Belgian regions of Wallonia, 
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Flanders and Brussels. In Britain, choosing the ‘easterly route’ of the high-speed railway also 
reflected an anticipation of its potential contribution to the regeneration of the Thames Gateway, or 
the Thames estuary region stretching from East London to Kent and Sussex, including ‘some of the 
most deprived urban areas’ in the country42. At the EU level, the proliferation of Euroregions in the 
1990s was actively promoted as ‘the most common form of institutionalised cross-border 
cooperation’ 43  through structural fund initiatives such as INTERREG. Furthermore, the cross-
Channel rail network would soon be expanded to include Belgium and become one of the first 
priority projects in the European Commission’s ambitious initiative of Trans-European Transport 
Network (TEN-T). As the centrepiece of both the Euroregion and the TEN-T, the Channel Tunnel is 
thus envisioned to play a key role in facilitating cross-border regional cooperation and materialising 
the ‘emergent spatialities’44 of Europe, which have been described in both official discourses and 
academic interventions through such catchwords as a ‘Europe of regions’ and ‘network Europe’. 
In sharp contrast to this ‘postnational’ geopolitical imagination is the Schengen border 
regime that has had an influence on ‘all the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements for the 
management of their frontiers’ 45  in Europe and that has shaped the reterritorialisation of the 
Channel Tunnel space in a drastically different way. As a consequence of the UK’s opting out of the 
Schengen Agreement, all the major stations in the cross-channel rail network including London St 
Pancras, Paris Gare du Nord and Brussels Gare du Midi are listed as border-crossing points in the 
Schengen Borders Code. In other words, the transportation network and the vehicles have become 
the external borders of the Schengen area, which is built upon a complex set of EU rules and 
mechanisms of cooperation between national border authorities. In this context, when the bilateral 
agreement between the UK and France concerning the governance of the tunnel was expanded to 
include Belgium, there was good reason for the new party to believe that the existing rules on 
jointly managing the ‘control zones’ might be in conflict with relevant provisions in the Schengen 
Agreement, of which both France and Belgium are signatories, and Article 7 of the EC Treaty that 
provides for free movement of persons within the Community.  
Upon the request of the Belgian delegation, therefore, a new article (Art. 27) was inserted to 
the original Agreement which stated that Community law prevails over the provisions of the 
Agreement and the Protocol. In addition, the Belgian government made a unilateral declaration 
claiming that ‘the Agreement and the Protocol does not prejudice the willingness of Belgium to 
implement the Schengen Agreement’, and that all control procedures provided by the Schengen 
Agreement on entry to and exit from Schengen countries shall be applied at the Brussels-Midi 
station. When ratifying the tripartite agreement and the protocol at the Belgian Federal Parliament, 
an explanatory memorandum further confirmed that ‘while Belgium does not waive its right to 
carry out checks on board, it has decided that the majority of checks would take place before 
departure at Brussels-Midi’, which must be regarded as an external border of the Schengen area46. 
This anecdote in the drafting of the tripartite agreement prior to the opening of the tunnel is worth 
mentioning for it exemplifies some of the unique ways the Schengen regime is configured. It first of 
all foregrounds the discrepancies between EU and Schengen borders resulted from the asymmetrical 
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and flexible approach to European integration, though these discrepancies tend to be, intentionally 
or not, concealed in discursive framings that presume an implicit correspondence between the 
territory of the Union and the Schengen Area. Depending on the context, Schengen is referred to as 
‘a territory’ or confused with ‘territory of the Union’ when emphasis is placed on transnational 
controls of human mobility within and to the EU 47 . The potential conflict between the 
intergovernmental agreement on managing cross-border railway mobility and the Schengen 
regulation further reveals that, as Christiansen and Jørgensen put it, the walls ‘around the alleged 
“Fortress Europe”’ are ‘erected by individual policies’ and they intersect48. The Belgian insistance 
on pre-embarkation and arrival checks at Brussels-Midi reminds us that the borders of Schengen are 
not only incoherent and variable, but also non-linear, in that they are officially defined by a set of 
scattered and connected ‘crossing-points’ such as airports, sea ports and train stations, of which a 
list must be regularly updated by each Member State49. In this sense Schengen borders exemplify, 
in physical and institutional terms, what has been termed the ‘pixelisation of borders’ or the shift of 
borders from lines to ‘points of connection’ distributed over networks and flows50, though these 
transformations have been previously described only with reference to virtual, biometrical, and thus 
ubiquitous borders51.  
The heterogeneous ‘rule structures’ underpinning the bordering of the Channel Tunnel area 
tell us more than the ambiguities of the Schengen system. They also reveal that contrasting visions 
of EU territory and different modalities of border governance are not only correlated, but also 
practically intertwined in the reconfiguration of certain European border regions as simultaneously 
‘internal’ and ‘external’. Studies of border security have analysed the efforts to reconcile free 
movement and security imperatives in the EU framework of border management 52 . Equally 
important is to note that the mechanisms of Schengen bordering operate differently in different 
geopolitical contexts and in connection with other imaginaries, discourses and policy frameworks 
such as European spatial policy and border regions. In this case, the common thread that connects 
the Euroregion, the TEN-T and the Schengen visa regime is the envisioning and governance of a 
European space of frictionless, competitive and secured mobility (and speed), a project itself 
depending on certain forms of immobility (and slowness). However, the priority of external frontier 
controls in the Schengen regime and the perspective of economic integration in spatial development 
inevitably impact on one another in the fragile process of harmonising these competing visions of 
EU (and state) territory. For instance, it has been pointed out that one of the reasons for relatively 
low levels of cross-border economic integration in this region, comparing to similar projects such as 
the Øresund bridge between Denmark’s capital region and South Sweden, is that all cross-border 
movement is subject to passport controls53. On the other hand, local, national and European actors 
are able to draw on discourses of Euroregions, free movement as well as a competitive European 
rail market to produce a counter-narrative to securitisation. It is against this background of legal and 
institutional complexities that the next section sets out to examine the contingent and context-
dependent ways in which mobile borders are performed in the formation and management of 
recurrent migration controversies surrounding the Channel Tunnel, Eurostar and the camps. 
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From stowaways to loopholes: the making of mobile borders 
As mentioned earlier, the Channel Tunnel and attempted unauthorised crossings have in the 
past decades been associated with recurrent episodes of security anxiety and humanitarian 
emergency. The first wave of controversies was focused on the presence of a Red Cross reception 
centre located in Sangatte between 1999 and 2002, which aroused popular sentiments about 
‘invasions’ of migrants on the British side and gave rise to concerns about humanitarian grievances 
and public order on the French side54. Following a meeting between then British Home Secretary 
David Blunkett and French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, the Sangatte centre was closed in 
2002. What continued to occupy its proximate geographical area and the public imagination of 
border threats has been the makeshift camp in Calais known as ‘the jungle’. The anxious sentiments 
associated with the ‘abuse’ of the Eurostar service reached a climax at the end of 2011, when the 
so-called ‘Lille Loophole’ was exposed to public attention. In November 2011, BBC published 
leaked internal correspondence among the employees of the UK Border Agency (UKBA) which 
revealed that ‘illegal migrants’ could enter the UK without going through immigration checks by 
boarding a train in Brussels with a ticket to Lille, because passport controls were not required for 
travels within Schengen; nor were they conducted on board or upon arrival. The report specifically 
provided the details about the following scene:  
One UKBA officer describes an incident in April at a Brussels station where he stopped two 
Iranians who he said "bore all the hallmarks of Lille loopholers". 
After they were questioned the Belgian police intervened. 
One officer shouted: "This has got to stop. You are not in Britain now, you are in Schengen. 
If they make a complaint you will be arrested."55 
The publication of this story not only yet again provoked sensationalist narratives in the British 
media about the vulnerability of the British borders vis-à-vis EU rules, but also led the UK 
government to demand Eurostar to suspend service in Calais and Lille. After a tripartite meeting 
held in Brussels in February 2012, the stops at Lille and Calais were resumed, and post-arrival 
passport checks for passengers travelling from Brussels, Calais and Lille were temporarily 
introduced at London St Pancras station. Unsurprisingly, in the midst of the Europe-wide refugee 
‘crisis’, the Calais ‘jungle’ has made headlines in national news on both sides of the channel yet 
again since 2014, even after its demolition in late 2016.  
The highly diverse, unpredicted and multi-sited practices organised around representing and 
governing the mobility of people and things across the Channel Tunnel bring to the fore inherently 
contestable meanings of the border – or borderscapes. For Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, the concept 
of borderscapes provides an entry point from which to study ‘practices, performances, and 
discourses that seek to capture, contain, and instrumentally use the border’. It emphasises that 
border spaces are not static but ‘fluid’ and ‘disjunctive’; nor are they organised through ‘a central 
body’ such as sovereign power, but zones of ‘competing and even contradictory emplacements’56. 
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A similar approach has emerged in the studies of mobilities. Salter conceptualises the contemporary 
mobility regime as an ‘assemblage of circulation’, which involves technologies of control and 
facilitation that are not hierarchically organised or monopolisied by state power. They are instead 
‘rhizomatic, disaggregated, and heterogeneous’, bringing together ‘overlapping, competing, and 
uncoordinated efforts to manage circulation’57. In this vein, the analysis below is structured around 
three key, intertwined rationales that are weaved into the representations, performances and 
discourses seeking to manage migration controversies from the Sangatte centre to  the latest ‘crisis’, 
namely security, economy – framed in terms of regional integration and competitiveness, and 
humanitarianism. The border theatre of the Channel Tunnel is thus reflective of similar modes of 
development in the governance of migration and borders at the EU level, in which the discourses of 
security, economy and fundamental rights as parameters of migration politics are, in the words of 
Feldman, wrapped into ‘an integrated moral whole’58. The stage, however, is marked by legal 
ambiguities in both the governing treaties of the tunnel and the EU’s Schengen rules reviewed 
earlier. This is combined with a specific geophysical environment which renders any disordered 
mobilities an immediate obstruction, both literally and symbolically, to the ‘smooth operation of 
infrastructural mobilities’ 59  vital to economic competitiveness and cross-border regionalism. 
Together, then, the uncoordinated efforts of different public and private authorities, media and civil 
society actors to manage mobility and whereby making borders do not only produce incoherencies 
in their attempts to harmonise these contradictory rationales, but also foreground tensions and 
disjunctions within each of them.   
Securitising the Channel Tunnel in muddy waters 
It seems evident from the very beginning that logics of security and securitisation have 
dominated state and private actors’ legal, discursive and technical responses to periodic migration 
‘crises’ around the Channel Tunnel. These responses have for example included the additional 
protocol introduced in 2000 to prevent illegal entries, the increased militarisation of the physical 
sites around Eurotunnel facilities, and security discourses focused on irregular border-crossing and 
the transit camp. In the wake of Sangatte, Eurotunnel allegedly spent two million pounds in 2000 
enhancing security and surveillance measures by introducing dog patrols and carbon dioxide checks 
and installing a 6-feet high razor wire fence at the terminals. Speaking of a ‘flood of illegal 
migrants’, the company even granted journalists special access to their railway yards in order that 
they could produce newsworthy images of migrants climbing onto freight trains60. To tackle a new 
episode of ‘crisis’ in 2014, the UK government offered to send the security fences used at a 
previous NATO Summit to Calais, and further funded a 13-feet wall to be built near the tunnel 
entrance in 2016. The spectacle of militarisation, however, goes far beyond the physical sites. 
Although the camps in Sangatte and Calais have been a major source of security paranoia for 
Britain, the estimated number of asylum-seekers staying there varies from a few hundreds to a few 
thousands at different times61. This is a mere fraction of the total number of migrant arrivals in 
countries such as France, Germany and Italy around the same period, and would also make a small 
proportion of new asylum applications in the UK – if they manage to make the extremely perilous 
journey through the tunnel. The high visibility of the issue in political discourses and mass media 
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has to do with, as Walters observes, the way vehicles and harbours have been contrived as the 
primary medium of the visual dramatisation of irregular migration, even though illegal entry is not 
the major ‘pathway to irregularity’62. The Channel Tunnel, along with the trains and lorries, has in 
this context provided a focal point for visualising the idea of border threats, which is made real 
through the circulation of numerous images in newspapers and TV news shows depicting ‘would-be’ 
illegal migrants wandering in the terminal area or found hidden under lorries. The images are often 
accompanied by dehumanising descriptions referring to unauthorised travellers as ‘flood’ or 
‘swarm’, which have also been used by government ministers. The visual thus ‘speak’ through 
interacting with other visuals and textual discourses, and together they ‘produce the effects that they 
name’ in the process of ‘recitation and repetition’63. Most recently, maps and satellite images have 
become another popular medium of representing and whereby performing border ‘crises’. It has 
been long recognised in critical geography that maps are not merely objective renderings of the 
world. They are rather expressive and productive of ‘socially constructed knowledge’, and because 
of the scientific status of cartography they have the power to naturalise this knowledge and 
influence ‘our imagined geographies’ in a subliminal way64. With clearly marked custom controls, 
boarding areas, tunnel entrance as well as locations of security fences, satellite maps such as Figure 
165 contribute to popular geopolitical imaginations by ‘objectively’ representing, in details and with 
precision, the Eurotunnel station located outside the British territory as the national frontier that 
needs to be secured.     
However, local, national and non-state actors involved in securitising the Channel Tunnel 
borderscapes each construct the meaning of security differently and have a different approach to the 
relationship between security and other imperatives. Whereas the informal settlement of asylum 
seekers in the vicinity of the tunnel entrance symbolises an ever-present danger to sovereign border 
security for the British, it is mainly viewed as a problem of public security on the French side, 
leading local residents to demand more police forces and national politicians to dispute the division 
of responsibilities between the two countries66. The dramatic encounter at Brussels-Midi station 
further shows that security actors in Belgium may prioritise Schengen rules rather than British 
border agents’ extraterritorial power in control zones. The conflicting political stakes and uncertain 
distribution of responsibilities between these managers and regulators of borders are well illustrated 
by a series of actions taken by Eurotunnel against French and British governments.  
Amidst the height of the Sangatte controversy in 2001, the UK Home Office decided to 
impose a penalty of 2000 GBP per stowaway on Eurotunnel, which could be seen as a tactic of 
outsourcing sovereign border enforcement to private actors through carrier sanctions. It has been 
argued that the trend of privatising border security supposedly improves cost-effectiveness by 
turning ‘private actors into regulators’67. This logic nonetheless proves less obvious in reality, as 
private organisations ‘do’ security work in their own interests and with their own strategic 
calculations. Eurotunnel’s move to allow the press to film in restricted areas, under the 
circumstances, was part of its campaign against the civil penalty regime. Portraying itself as a 
victim of Britain’s flawed immigration system, Eurotunnel also filed a complaint to the European 
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Commission, claiming that the incursions by asylum-seekers ‘created an obstacle of the free 
movement of goods’68. After a six-month campaign by the company, the UK government decided to 
lifted the civil penalty, which according to the Home Secretary was due to a ‘dramatic fall in the 
number of people getting through illegally’ 69 . Others suggest that pressures from the French 
government also ‘played a significant role’, since the extension of sanctions also effected the 
Frence-owned SNCF 70 . Yet Eurotunnel continued its legal action and brought arbitration 
proceedings before an international tribunal against both governments. The company claimed that 
both had failed in fulfilling their obligations under the Concession Agreement to protect the Fixed 
Link from incursions and related damage and expenses, and that the UK government’s imposition 
of civil penalty as well as costs of dentation and removal of migrants on the carrier was another 
instance of disregarding its obligations under the Agreement. Interestingly enough, France argued 
that the disruptions caused by migrant incursions were ‘vastly exaggerated’ by the claimant, and the 
UK consistently held that combating ‘clandestine activity’ in or near control zones on the French 
side was not its responsibility. The tribunal eventually granted partial award to Eurotunnel in 2007, 
establishing that both governments failed to ‘maintain conditions of normal security and public 
order in and around’ the terminal required by the Concession Agreement and recognising the 
operator’s right to compensation71. The proceedings document in a detailed way how multiple 
actors and multiple interests come together to dispute the division of responsibilities for securing 
the tunnel and to effectively challenge the privatising trend of border security.  
Economic reasoning and humanitarian discourse 
Furthermore, economic concerns about whether ‘failures’ in effective frontier control affect 
Eurotunnel’s revenue and competition with other operators are also a key battleground in the 
arbitration case. The pursuit of orderly, profitable circulation alongside effective controls is not only 
a chief goal of the carrier, but indeed the guiding principle of governing cross-border mobility 
stipulated by the Channel Tunnel treaty. In the Foucauldian sense, the centrality of circulation or 
‘free movement’ is not the antithesis of security but defines the purpose of security politics, which 
is ‘ensuring that things are always in movement’ in a way that ‘the inherent dangers of this 
circulation are cancelled out.’72 The material and affective landscapes of the infrastructural space 
itself embodies this nexus. If the stark militarisation of the terminal areas in Calais and the 
inhumane conditions of the camp perform an spectacle of sovereign, coercive power that is directed 
at ‘fixing and demarcating the territory’73, then the stylish retail units and welcome atmospheres of 
London St. Pancras perfectly embody the ethos of neoliberal borders which is cultivated through the 
‘comfy cosmopolitan circuits’ of privileged citizens74. As P. Adey et al. observe, the staff of the 
station have worked hard to produce a ‘luxuriant atmospheric gateway’ to London, or ‘positive 
sense of arrival’ wrought by openness and clarity, and the necessity of security and border checks is 
dealt with ‘atmospherically’ through floor design and creation of ‘shifting aural ambiences’75. The 
affective atmospheres of hospitality and openness, which are even more ‘tangible’ than in the 
modern airport isolated from the urban space, work to smooth over interruptions that are necessary 
for ‘cancelling out’ the dangers inherent to circulation. Furthermore, the material and affective 
‘moorings’ of comfortable, friction-free mobility not only render the coercive and exclusionary 
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dimensions of sovereign border control largely invisible for legitimated travellers, but also 
strengthen the regime of control by raising the threshold for entering into the circulatory system. 
Craig Martin makes this point with regard to the well protected vehicle necessitated by accelerated 
mobility, which according to him is both a ‘protective cushion’ for privileged travellers and an 
‘exclusionary divide barring illegitimated peoples’76, leading to ever more perilous and violent 
forms of mobility for the latter77.  
The ideal balance between border policing and the facilitation of mobility, however, is 
contingent by nature and constantly subject to unpredictable interruptions. When frictions emerge, 
economic reasoning may be employed to reinforce the securitisation agenda, as Eurotunnel’s 
strategy demonstrates, or against it, as seen in the French and Belgian reactions to the ‘Lille 
loophole’ accident. The Belgian Prime Minister criticised London’s decision to suspend through 
stations by insisting that the move would be of great consequence for the development of the entire 
Euroregion consisting of Kent, Nord-Pas de Calais, Wallonia and Flanders78. Similarly, the French 
underlined the importance of maintaining ‘quality rail services’ in Nord-Pas de Calais with regard 
to its ‘specific geography and international positioning’ 79 . Here the spatial imaginary of the 
borderland as a Euroregion of ‘interregional cooperation and competition across national borders’80 
was explicitly invoked to confront that of ‘traditional’ statist borders. The troublesome relationship 
between security and economic reasoning in this context can be intensified by the conflation of the 
territorial border and the mobility infrastructure itself. This means activities of border transgression, 
even unsuccessful, involve infiltrating or disrupting the circulatory system upon which capitalist 
economy depends. An extreme example was an emergency measure called Operation Stack put in 
place in Kent in the summer of 2015, which was caused by both strikes by French workers and 
migrant incursions. The prolonged situation of disrupted traffic and was reportedly costing the 
freight industry ‘£750,000 a day’ while the local economy of Kent was ‘losing £1.5m a day’81. On 
the other hand, any security and immigration requirements would make it less advantageous for the 
project to realise its economic rationale. In a 2011 report, the House of Lords European Union 
Committee notes that the border control procedures for Eurostar are already so ‘onerous’ as to 
negate ‘some of the advantages of train travel over flying’82. It also mentions that while Eurostar 
has sought to extend its service to Germany and the Netherlands, neither country appears friendly to 
the idea of UKBA officers performing controls on their territory. These concerns prove not 
unfounded: because of Schengen rules and the characteristics of train travel, passengers travelling 
from Lyon and Marseille to London have to disembark in Lille and undergo passport control checks, 
which according to Eurostar may take up to 80 minutes. Eurostar’s plan to launch direct service to 
Amsterdam has also not been materialised so far, perhaps with an even lesser probability to succeed 
after Brexit. It seems that the national and private border authorities are yet to find a solution to 
achieve the goal of reconciling efficient controls with the seamlessness of accelerated mobility 
anticipated in the Channel Tunnel Treaty – at least not on Eurostar.      
Lastly, the discourses and practices that engage and reproduce the security/mobility nexus of 
neoliberal borders also frequently draw on humanitarian reason, which resonates with the increasing 
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emphasis on humanitarian and human rights norms in the broader EU border regime and beyond. 
As researchers of humanitarian borders have explicated, the ‘politics of pity’ and that of control are 
not contradictory but mutually constitutive, with ‘policing often accompanied by a gesture toward 
the humane… where force is justified in the name of peace and right’ 83 . In governing the 
borderzone, both British and French governments and Eurotunnel have deployed humanitarian 
rhetoric to justify the need to demolish the camp and tighten security measures84. However, what 
Fassin terms humanitarian reason, or the moral argument that views ‘the preservation of life and the 
alleviation of suffering as the highest value of action’85, and the power of care and control it enables 
interacts with the sovereign logic of excluding in varied and paradoxical ways. As the archetypical 
object of humanitarian care, unaccompanied minors in Calais became an urgent issue in the 
governmental negotiation before the camp was demolished. Again mirroring the EU’s incorporation 
of values of solidarity and humanity as part of its institutional identity, French politicians appealed 
to these principles and called on their counterpart to deal with the dispute ‘in a manner in keeping 
with the history and the values’ of these two countries 86 . The latter’s acceptance of 750 
unaccompanied minors on the one hand gestured to confirm its ‘liberal will-to-care’ 87  and 
seemingly limited its sovereign power for respecting international obligations, yet on the other hand 
reaffirms the fundamental differentiation at the heart of humanitarian reason – that between those 
who are worth saving and those not.  
It is in this context that the public staging of the ‘Lille loophole’ becomes especially 
efficacious in inciting anti-immigration sentiment 88 . Chouliaraki contends that humanitarian 
sensibility is grounded on a ‘theatrical arrangement that separates safe spectators from vulnerable 
others’ and the ‘staging of spectacles of suffering’ 89 . In a similar fashion, the imaginary of 
humanitarian borders relies on the existence of two parallel mobilities that are at once incompatible 
with and interdependent on each other: the accelerated, secured and smooth mobility of legitimated 
travelers; and the interrupted, dangerous and turbulent (im)mobility of illegitimated ones. The 
irregular ways of going through the Channel, such as jumping on to trains and hiding in the locked 
metal compartments or in the lorries, are presented in media as a sheer contrast to the luxuriant and 
atmospheric style of travel which can be enjoyed with ‘breakfast in Brussels, lunch in London, 
dinner in Paris’ and provoke humanitarian sentiment alongside security anxiety. But the carefully 
balanced and supposedly productive relationship between security, economic and humanitarian 
rationalities collapses in the ‘Lille loophole’ scenario. Capsularised mobilities no longer function as 
an ‘exclusionary divide’, and the spectacle of suffering is no longer there to cultivate feelings of 
compassion. It is the safe distance and cruel discontinuity between legitimated and illegitimated 
means of mobility that guarantees the pitifulness of the latter. 
In concluding this section, I would like to mention a European Parliament resolution 
adopted in the context of the Sangatte dispute. It speaks of the ‘deeply damaging’ impact the 
situation has on trade and businesses, calls on governments and carriers to ensure ‘effective security 
measures’, spells out the importance of adopting a ‘humane’ approach to asylum procedures, and 
urges both the Commission and national governments to ensure free movement of goods among 
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Member States as trains from as far as Spain and France are also ‘adversely affected’90. All the key 
themes of EU border governance are neatly weaved into this short text, which both suggests and 
constructs their institutional and normative compatibility. However, the contingent and 
uncoordinated responses of national, private and international actors to the episodic migration 
‘crises’ have repeatedly brought about the irreducible contradictions between and within each of 
these logics. Although governmental technologies such as carrier liability and the affective 
production of spaces for accelerated mobility are designed to integrate different rationalities into a 
mutually reinforcing nexus, they are innately challenged by the conflicting interests of multiple 
actors, legal uncertainties as well as the material properties of the mobile border itself.  
From Calais to Dover, or, the politics of turbulent mobilities 
We have thus far mainly taken the perspective of various border authorities – and to a less 
degree the media – to investigate the laws, discourses and representations they have produced and 
the political rationalities they perform in bordering the Channel Tunnel. The remainder of the paper 
briefly considers how turbulent, subversive and violent forms of mobility challenge and interact 
with the disaggregated regime of border and mobility governance. The camps in and around Calais, 
which have been demolished by the French police and rebuilt again for several times, have been 
studied by critical migration scholars as not only spaces of sovereign exception, but also spaces of 
contestation, solidarity and subjectivisation. These interventions view migrant and solidarity 
movements as ‘acts of citizenship’ through which migrants claim the rights to which they have been 
denied and enact themselves as citizen-subjects91. On the other hand, scholars have also cautioned 
against treating the politics of mobility and the apparatuses of border control as two separate fields 
and ‘analytically privileging one over the other’92. Situated in this critical literature, this section 
focuses on the routes and means of turbulent mobilities, instead of more expressive forms of 
contestation, and sheds light on how the radical politics of mobility is intricately entangled with the 
technologies, rationalities and spaces of border governance. I underline in particular how the 
material characteristics of the moving borders play into this entanglement and can potentially turn 
the extraterritorial logic of sovereignty against itself.  
It needs to be acknowledged that first of all each specific border-crossing from Calais to 
Dover, whether by high speed train, freight, truck or lorry, is just one among a plurality of choices 
made according to the migrant’s chosen moving strategy93. Furthermore, in the same way as the 
bordering practice is not limited to the territorial borders but expanded both within and outside them, 
crossing the channel, failed or succeeded, is neither the beginning nor the end of a journey. Making 
it through the Channel does not necessarily mark the end of illegality or immobility. Due to the lack 
of sufficient documents, they may still face the possibility of being deported from or detained in 
their destination country94. Nonetheless, as Mezzadra argues, the very act of unauthorised border-
crossing must be understood as a political claim in itself as it undermines the governmental regime 
and ‘constitutes a material critique of the international division of labour and marks profoundly the 
subjectivity of the migrant also in the country where she/he chooses to settle down’95. Such acts 
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also expose and intensify the contradictions of the security-economy-humanitarian nexus 
underpinning the heterogeneous projects of neoliberal bordering; and oblige the assemblage of 
mobility management to oscillate between practices that put more weight on some logics than 
others.  
However, it is equally important to recognise that strategies of resistance operate ‘not just in 
an extrinsic relationship’ to regimes of control, but within them96 . As shown in the previous 
sections, the ambiguities of Schengen rules and the multiplicity of actors and interests involved in 
the bordering of the Channel Tunnel space render this assemblage of actors and rules fragile and 
contingent upon context-dependent decisions. This fragility has contributed to the existence of 
‘loopholes’ which might be exploited by unauthorised travelers, often in ad hoc and haphazard 
manners, to achieve short-term goals in flexible life trajectories. Moreover, these subdued forms of 
resistance are immanent to the border regime also in another sense, namely they involve 
instrumentally appropriating technologies and rationalities of liberal government such as the 
commodification of mobility and humanitarian reason. While the supranational, state and non-state 
authorities engaged in the management of borders cope with the problem of security and circulation 
through differential commodification of mobility – filtering out or slowing down dangerous forms 
whereas making desirable and profitable ones as speedy as possible, the smuggling and migrant 
networks plan their journey through shifting speeds and employ the same logic: ‘travelling without 
frontiers as long as you pay at the start’97. 
The geographical specificities of the mobile border zone and the means of travel play a 
crucial part in the interplay between mobility governance and the movements that seek to escape its 
grasp. First, irregular and violent journeys in this context are made possible not only through using 
illicit networks of commodity mobility, but also by infiltrating, through a kind of ‘parasitic 
harnessing’, the physical network of infrastructural mobility and vehicular spaces which have been 
constructed as ‘mobile zones of governance’98. Secondly, as we have seen, the functional ‘fusion’ 
of geographical borders and the transportation network means that turbulent mobilities always 
contain a potential risk of disrupting the circulatory system far beyond the territorial edge. In the 
case of Eurostar, the characteristics of train travel and also render it impossible to achieve the goal 
of filtering out undesirable mobility without introducing ‘obnoxious’ measures that slow down the 
whole system designed to embody rapidity. Thirdly, if the trains have been turned into mobile 
borders through the installation of a ‘continuum’ of policing, they also become spaces that contain a 
continuum of potential border-crossing points. It is particularly interesting to consider how the 
communicative feature of territory is amplified in this dynamics. In his theorisation of territoriality, 
Sack posits that relations defined in territorial terms are abstract and ‘simplistic’ compared to those 
in organic or traditional societies, for communication in the former case requires only ‘one kind of 
marker or sign – the boundary’99. As long as the boundaries of modern political community are 
defined (also) in geographical terms, it is ultimately penetrable. Their geophysicality offers the very 
condition under which ‘the right to escape’ can be exercised. In this light, the practice of juxtaposed 
controls extends not only sovereign power but also the ethical relations implicated by the concept of 
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territory beyond the traditional borderline and to the transportation network. This is confirmed in 
the form of law by attributing the responsibility of processing asylum applications to the country of 
destination once ‘the train doors are closed’. Thus at least in theory an extraterritorial right to 
asylum is recognised, which generates an indeterminate relationship between those travelling 
without paper and the territory they are neither ‘inside’ nor ‘outside’.  
Comparing to the parasitic harnessing of vehicles, crossing the Channel Tunnel on foot is 
rare but not non-existent. Most notably two waves of approximately 550 asylum seekers attempted 
to do so on the Christmas day of 2001, although they were caught by the police soon after they 
entered the tunnel .In 2015, a Sudanese national named Abdul Rahman Haroun managed to, almost 
miraculously, walk nearly the entire length of the tunnel after ‘climbing four fences, evading 
international search teams and as many as 400 security cameras’100. It must be pointed out that such 
journeys are fatally dangerous and are a matter of gambling with one’s life in a desperate game of 
‘good chance or no chance’101. Without romanticising such choices or reading any emancipatory 
telos into them, I nonetheless find these acts of resistance extraordinary, in that they not only 
undermine the apparatus of mobility control but also radically pluralise the meaning of borders and 
re-shape/scape the borderscapes. As Walters notes, routes and journeys are not just means of 
transportation; they also provide ‘a locus for problematisations of the human and for the possibility 
of politics’102. Whereas the logic of border policing entails turning ‘bridges’ into borders, this route 
reverses the logic by exploiting the space of the tunnel itself and staging human agency against its 
physical environment. Mr. Haroun was eventually able to claim his right to stay by virtue of his 
territorial presence. Yet successful or not, these turbulent and unsettling movements reinvent by 
their very existence the constituent meaning inscribed in the structure of a tunnel as a ‘connector’, 
and thereby recover the dimensions of territory that communicate and connect from its 
conceptualisation monopolised by the sovereign state.    
Conclusion 
As Darian-Smith has meticulously demonstrated, the English Channel has historically 
occupied a prominent place in the construction of Britain’s insular identity through affective 
articulations of the relationship between nature and nation. She recalls that on the occasion of the 
inauguration of the Channel Tunnel in 1994, the then British Prime Minister said in an interview 
that it was a ‘potent symbol of Britain’s new role in Europe’103. It is perhaps no surprise that as 
British Prime Minister Theresa May triggered Article 50 to officially start the process of the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU two decades later, a tabloid newspaper chose to beam ‘farewell messages’ 
to their continent neighbours from the iconic white cliffs of Dover. The Channel Tunnel continued 
to be associated with the imaginary of an ever-present migration problem by both sides in the Brexit 
debate. While Leave campaigners framed Calais and Eurostar ‘loopholes’ as indicating a loss of 
national sovereignty and a need for ‘taking back control’, politicians advocating for Remain used a 
similarly scaremongering rhetoric by threatening that leaving the EU would bring the ‘Jungle’ to 
Kent. After the vote, France did informally express an intention to close UK border posts on its 
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territory, and during his presidential election campaign Emmanuel Macron mentioned that he would 
renegotiate the border agreement with the UK104. At this stage, the future of juxtaposed controls 
remains uncertain. However, it is clear that both the Brexit negotiation and any potential bilateral 
renegotiations will change the legal and institutional frameworks in which the mobile borders are to 
be governed.     
This article has suggested that the border-making projects and their contestations in the 
Channel Tunnel area constitute both an object of inquiry in its own right and a productive lens for 
examining some of the key questions emerged from critical scholarship on borders and migration. 
Approaching borders as institutional and geophysical realities that are constructed through practices, 
representations and discourses, the article has shown how conflicting visions of the European space 
and different rationales of mobility governance are intertwined in producing and managing the 
recurrent migration ‘crisis’ around the Channel Tunnel. The performances staged by national, local, 
private and European actors are both influenced by and a condensed expression of the logics of the 
EU border regime in the wider context. Any general observations or theorisations of EU border 
politics, however, must be attuned to the specific legal, institutional and material conditions under 
which the assemblage of mobility takes shape. In scrutinising this case I have paid special attention 
to legal ambiguities in both Schengen rules and relevant treaties, and how they interact with the 
materiality of the moving border and mobility routes. The functioning of the transportation network 
and vehicles as territorial borders – yet providing ‘fixed link’ to territories of destination – may 
contingently bring to the fore the communicative capability of territory. The ‘landscape’ is not only 
mobilised to generate images of threat and (in)security, but also impacting upon the ways in which 
turbulent mobilities challenge the apparatuses of border control and disrupt the smoothness of 
infrastructural mobility.    
The inquiry also provides a perspective on the broader question as to how the connective 
and dividing dimensions of geographical borders might be transformed by infrastructural projects. 
Comparisons with ‘mobile borders’ in similar geopolitical contexts such as the Øresund Bridge 
would make a constructive subject for future research. The bridge has been long considered a 
successful example of transport infrastructure facilitating cross-border regional integration between 
Denmark’s capital region and South Sweden. However, the Swedish government suspended the 
Schengen Agreement and put in place passport controls at both ends of the bridge for 15 months 
amid the recent refugee crisis. The decision has to do with both countries’ asylum policies and 
complicates the characterisation of Øresund as emblematic of a ‘borderless Europe’105. Furthermore, 
although this study has focused mainly on issues of border and migration control, this multi-
disciplinary research agenda will certainly benefit from engaging the debates in other fields such as 
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